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THE CASE FOR CONTEXT: EISENHOWER POST-REVISIONISM
AND THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM
By Seth Draine

Assessment of President Eisenhower’s foreign policy legacy by “revisionist” historians beginning in the late 1970s revealed the leader’s decisive and insightful
tactics that kept America in relative peace at the beginning of the Cold War.
Contrary to the image of Ike as an amiable golfer, removed from the tough
policy decisions that not only preceded and followed his presidency but existed
during his time in office, the majority of Eisenhower scholarship agrees that
through tactful and decisive actions, Ike “ran the show.”1
Stephen Ambrose is one such esteemed and well-versed scholar of the
Eisenhower presidency who, having met and conversed at length with the former
president, has produced a substantial number of publications on the subject
1
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and remains the preeminent scholar on Eisenhower. Throughout his writings,
Ambrose maintains that, for better or for worse, Eisenhower’s “impressive agility,
quickness, and intelligence of mind” guided his own style of foreign policy.2 For
Ambrose, guiding Eisenhower’s foreign policy was his firm belief that “nuclear
war was unimaginable, limited conventional war unwinnable, and stalemate
unacceptable,” while stressing the importance and readiness to fight communists “with every weapon at his disposal—just as he had fought the Nazis.”3
Ambrose acknowledges the administration’s failures within the Third World,
including perceiving and overreacting to communism within social reform
movements as well as a borderline obsession with falling dominoes, however,
Ambrose withholds judgment from these policy decisions claiming that “to
say Eisenhower was right about this or wrong about that is to do little more
than announce one’s own political position.”4 To this end, Ambrose questions
the historians’ ability to remove Eisenhower from the Cold War containment
framework of the decolonizing world due to “domestic pressures, the relentless
engagement of Moscow and Peking” meddling in the Third World, and the
“unrealistic expectations of Third World leaders in their requests for military
and economic aid.”5
Other scholars of the revisionist camp take a less-balanced yet equally
celebratory portrait of the President. H.W. Brands defends Eisenhower’s involvement in the developing world by suggesting that despite the Eisenhower
administration’s packaging of their policies “in the wrappings of ideology, the
product they sold reflected primarily a geopolitical interpretation of American
strategic, military, diplomatic, and economic interests and demonstrated shrewd
weighing of the effects on the international balance of power of the particular
activities of specific nonaligned countries.”6 The most recent biography on the
President by journalist Jim Newton, by far the most disappointing considering
the wealth of declassified information available since the 1970s and 80s, offers
2
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a repetition of earlier works with a glossier nostalgia for “a nation [left] freer,
more prosperous, and more fair” after Eisenhower left office. 7 Questionable
policy decision are legitimized and long-view consequences are acknowledged yet
disregarded as the Iranian coup of 1953 “seemed costly” yet in the end, “Iran lay
safely nestled within the American orbit for the balance of Eisenhower’s tenure,”
agreeing that “for the first time in three years, Iran was quiet—and still free.”8
Despite the insightful validity that the majority of the revisionist perspective provides, much of the “post-revisionist” scholarship has asked readers to
give more weight, when considering Eisenhower’s legacy, to the use of covert
actions within decolonized regions and the impact it has had on the developing
world. Following Ambrose’s intentions for a clearer picture of the Eisenhower
administration, this historiographical essay seeks to give this crucial period in
American and world history the context it deserves. Specifically, it will examine
the insights historians have provided on the motivations and impact of covert
operations, suggesting that a misreading or failed recognition of regionally
specific contexts led the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration
down interventionist paths with detrimental results in the Middle East, Central
America, and South-east Asia. Thus, context, rather than damnation from the
safety of hindsight, is the purpose of examining Eisenhower’s use of covert
action throughout the Third World. By complicating our understanding of
Cold War foreign policies to include geopolitical and economic strategies, as
well as deconstructing the Cold War and post-colonial environment in which
such decisions were enlisted, a more complete understanding of America’s use
and impact of covert action will arise.
Despite this historiography’s argument for context, it does not strive
to be a fully exhaustive historiographical narrative, nor an all-inclusive accounting of covert action and intervention during the Eisenhower years. For
the purpose of brevity, only the most well received scholars on each regional
intervention are discussed followed by a deconstructive account provided by
historians of cultural studies to add an additional dimension to Eisenhower’s
foreign policy decisions. Nor does this historiography include other interventions and plans pursued around the world such as in the Congo, Indochina,
Burma, Laos, Venezuela, or Cuba. What proceeds is a chronological and regional
7
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discussion of the CIA covert operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia by
“post-revisionist” historians and authors. It seeks to dissect the motivations
and impact of Eisenhower’s covert foreign policy decisions and the dangers of
ignoring crucial regional contexts.
In All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern
Terror, Stephen Kinzer’s spy novel-like coverage of the players, intricacies, and
motives surrounding the 1953 overthrow of Iranian president-elect, Muhammad
Musaddiq, provides a bilateral, economic context for the CIA led coup and
the dramatic repercussions that have plagued the region since. Taking a critical stance on the orchestrating and participation in the coup, Kinzer argues
that British oil control in the region was threatened by Musaddiq’s desire to
nationalize the industry, propagating unfounded fears of Iran’s path toward
communism. The result was the re-installation of Reza Shah who supported
British and American oil interests yet continued an oppressive tyranny that
ultimately led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, inspiring fundamentalists
such as the Taliban to gain strength and momentum in a post-Cold War world.
Despite Kinzer’s suspense ridden prose, his revealing narrative through
the use of both Iranian and American sources (following on the heels of leaked
CIA documents in 2000 to the New York Times that both confirmed and added
to historians’ knowledge of the American led events in 1953) has contributed
to an argument that supports the long view of history—where actions have far
reaching and often unforeseen impacts. To develop this argument, Kinzer addresses the three parties present during the build-up to the coup—Muhammad
Musaddiq of Iran, Winston Churchill of Britain, and from the United States,
Dwight Eisenhower and Allen and John Dulles—and their varying desires and
motives during the crisis.
Kinzer sets the stage with a brief overview of Iran’s long historical dilemma
between moral obligation and authoritarian foreign rule, beginning with the
rise of Zoroastrianism during the sixth century B.C.E. and ending with the
corrupt and irresponsible economic behavior of the Qajar monarchs in 1925,
allowing British colonial rule to overwhelm the political and economic (oil)
institutions of the region. Fast-forward twenty-four years of modernization
attempts, Nazi sympathizers, and a British/Russian invasion to instate Reza
Shah Pahlavi, Kinzer reveals his tragic protagonist, Mohammad Musaddiq. As
a secular nationalist, Musaddiq was a champion of the democratic process, free
press, and the right of Iranians to discard British colonial subjugation in the
6
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political process and their primary economic industry—oil. On this secular
nationalist platform, Musaddiq was elected as Prime Minister in 1951, and
soon thereafter, nationalized the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.
For the second party, Britain, this development was unacceptable on two
counts: Britain maintained the right to rule their established colonies, and that
the oil profits from their colony sustained the British economy.9 Inciting help
from the third party, the United States, proved to be a necessary yet difficult
task. For former president Harry S. Truman, Cold War anxieties consumed his
worldview and colonialism was merely a waning, outdated mode of international
relations. After failed attempts at negotiation and reconciliation between Iran
and British interests, what ultimately bridged this ideological gap, for Kinzer,
were the Korean War and Soviet international communism. With the return of
the Conservative Churchill and the election of more active containment policies
of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the White
House was sold on the threat of Iran’s takeover by communists as not only
endangering the Middle East, but British supported efforts in Korea as well.10
If Kinzer paints the White House as being courted and persuaded by
the British, it was the clever work of the Secretary of State John Foster and his
brother, head of the CIA, Allen Dulles that ultimately convinced Eisenhower
to approve the CIA-led coup of Musaddiq. By distorting the implications of
negotiation deals between Britain and Iran concerning their oil holdings as well
as stirring dissent among prominent ties in Iran, the Dulles brothers were able to
make the case to remove an unreasonable and unsupported Musaddiq regime.
After expressing his “desire not to know too much,” Eisenhower was given the
“broad brush [strokes]” of the coup, leaving the ground work of Operation
AJAX up to CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt who implemented the operation’s
psychological warfare of propaganda and mob insurrection that ultimately led
to the arrest, overthrow, and imprisonment of Musaddiq.11
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, one of the major contributions
of Kinzer’s work to the fields of American history and foreign policy has been
his insistence of, not merely economic and Cold War anxieties as agents of
Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (New
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 88-91.
10
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intervention within the Third World, but allied pressure and manipulation
of these factors toward unscrupulous ends. Furthermore, Kinzer’s extensive
historical accounts of both British era colonialism and pre-modern roots of
foreign distrust and contempt offer a more complete understanding of regional
problems and priorities. However, such a macro-approach does have its pitfalls. Just as Kinzer takes the long view of historical impact leading up to the
election of Musaddiq, his conclusion that the events that followed the coup’s
reinstating of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s oppressive regime led to the overwhelming
distrust and anger toward the United States and the West creates a simplified
picture of the Middle East. Certainly Reza Shah’s oppression and imprisonment of religious leaders and political adversaries contributed to the Islamic
Revolution and terrorist fringe that spiraled from it. However, overall distaste
for the West must include other factors such as the Suez Crisis just three years
later, Kennedy’s land and liberal reforms imposed on the Shah, and Johnson’s
and Nixon’s support of Israel.12 Kinzer’s contribution to our remembering of
the 1953 CIA-led coup is invaluable, riveting, and illuminating, however, by
presuming such a clear line of causation, he simplifies the very region that he
works so diligently to complicate.
Just as Kinzer works to expand our understanding of the Iranian coup by
concentrating on the persuasive arguments made by European allies and within
the White House, John Foran’s “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the
CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah” complicates
the policy decision further through a deconstruction of U.S. domestic influences. By examining popular cultural discourse in America during the 1940s
and 1950s, Foran sheds light on the influences of Orientalism within the press
and its great impact on American foreign policy in Iran and the subsequent
CIA-led coup in 1953. For Foran, along with the Cold War context of the
political economy of oil and geostrategic power within the Middle East, the
1953 coup was a product of a battle over discursive hegemony between the
Orientalist discourse of American and Iranian actors, specifically Musaddiq.
Ultimately, it was Time Magazine’s condemnation of the tumultuous region
12
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during Truman’s presidency that helped bring about an administration more
willing to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs.13
Due to his source emphasis on popular press, Foran first seeks to articulate
his “thick descriptive” theoretical dimensions by defining and explaining cultural
studies in the context of Marxist literary criticism and subaltern studies to create
what he defines as “third world cultural studies.”14 Within these general and
fluctuating boundaries of his version of cultural studies, Foran contends that
the press, most notably Time magazine, “framed” public and elite discussion
through its ability to create a general popular mood, provide a check on policy
elites, and to give or withhold legitimacy from dissenting views. In turn, these
“frames” of constructed social realities, reflected long-standing Orientalist images
and stereotypes of Easterners as inferior, childish, and feminine.15
To understand how Time influenced American foreign policy, Foran
argues that from its inception, the magazine was a key shaper of American political culture and through its devotion to Republican, pro-business lines, and
commitment to bringing the “serious issues of world politics” to an educated
American audience, by the 1940s and 50s Time (and its subsidiary Life) had
become the most influential shaper of public opinion in America.16 To demonstrate this assertion, Foran reveals not only the fluctuating attention by Time
to the events in Iran and the change in U.S. administration, but the language
used to report on it throughout each stage of the international development.
In this instance, although all politics in Iran were covered as corrupt in the
U.S., the treatment of Reza Shah and Musaddiq differed significantly. While
the Shah maintained both Middle Eastern stereotypes of youthful ignorance
and Western sensibilities of class and educated business interests, Musaddiq
is at first briefly depicted as honest, of Western education, and devoted to
13
John Foran, “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq,
and the Installation of the Shah” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United
States Imperialism, 1945-1966, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 2000), 182.
14
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democracy and anti-Soviet communism, but then quickly turns into a weak
man of childish fanatical tantrums.17
By the time of the 1952 election, much of Time and Life magazine had
been devoted to criticizing the Truman administration’s weak stance on containment and supported the installation of “strong men” in order to insure
stability and “order” in regions of interest.18 With Eisenhower’s election (Henry
Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life, often bragged that his editorial work
had elected Ike into office), Time and Life publications were at the forefront
of positing communist “domino theories” with Iran, not Vietnam, at the top.
Both publications heavily supported the removal of Musaddiq under these
presumptions. However, for Foran, this fear was a view held at the top, not
by lower-level Iranian specialists within the State Department, who arguably
had more contextual knowledge of the region and its underlining nationalist
prerogatives. Thus, the influence of the press in sustaining a Cold War view
of the world helped legitimize the necessity of a coup and in the aftermath of
political trials of Musaddiq, the benefits of a redefined “older,” “wiser”, yet a
rejuvenated and “firm” Shah.19
Foran qualifies his theoretical approach by admitting the absence of a
clear line of causality between Orientalist discourse and foreign policy decisions. However, this does not make these mindsets irrelevant, as they serve as
contextual realities that reveal themselves in the language used by policy officials,
perpetuating and applying ideas of weakness versus strength, masculinity versus
femininity, and aptitude versus child-like ignorance. Therefore, a deconstruction
of why and how ideological frameworks are created and sustained is crucial
for understanding the decision making process of top foreign policy leaders.
In his well received analysis, The CIA in Guatemala, Richard Immerman
argues that though protection of United Fruit (UFCO) business interests in
Guatemala was paramount, a basic misunderstanding of Guatemalan people
and history by the U.S. government and public resulted in the ensuing coup and
conflict between the two nations. Rather than “merely another instance of big
stick diplomacy,” American covert action in Guatemala illustrates McCarthyera, Cold War ethos of economic and ideological security abroad from a Soviet
Ibid., 169-171.
Ibid., 174.
19
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international-conspiracy. The result was a skewing of regional revolutions where
the line between nationalism and communist subversion was narrowed to a
point where threats to U.S. interests became the only discernible difference.
To thwart communist subversion, the Eisenhower administration pushed for
the use of decisive and preventative covert measures as opposed to costly and
thinly spread containment policies.
The argument for context begins with an understanding of the 1944
Guatemalan Revolution and the nationalist desire to overthrow a legacy of
exploitation and underdevelopment by foreign rule in Guatemala. Immerman
traces back racial divisions and land consolidation to sixteenth-century Spanish
rule, however, the dichotomy between imperial growth at the cost of Guatemalan
underdevelopment explodes with the liberal era of industrialization, foreign
investment, and public services beginning in the late nineteenth century. 20
Specifically, Guatemala’s growing dependence on U.S. business investment, most
notably but not solely United Fruit, resulted in the skewing of land ownership,
exploitation of indigenous labor, reliance on an export based resource economy
for revenues and imports to sustain population needs, and political leaders that
accommodated such foreign investments at the cost of the Guatemalan people.
In October of 1944, such disparities within the nation were taken to the streets
and with it the overthrow of the oppressive regime of Jorge Ubico Casteneda.
In his place emerged the revolution’s first elected president, Juan Jose Arevalo,
under promises of land and labor reform as well as social programs that would
become the cornerstone of the new Guatemalan government.21
From the October Revolution in 1944 to the election of Jacobo Arbenz
in 1950, Immerman contends that U.S. lack of preparedness (Ambassador
Boaz Long admitted to the State Department that the overthrow of Ubico
was “the farthest thing from my thoughts”) and understanding of the causes
behind the decade’s revolutionary and nationalizing events was due to a state of
denial about the capabilities of the “children” of Guatemala.22 Therefore, when
Guatemalans voiced dissent of “Yankee imperialism”—signified by United
Fruit-led government corruption, tax evasion, racist policies, and indifference
20
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: the Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1982), 22.
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to public welfare and wages—materialized in the revolutionary government’s
capitalist modernization plans for infrastructure development and agrarian
reform, UFCO lobbyists cried foul. What followed was a suspicious eye on
the labor reform policies under Arevalo, and a heightened sense of anxiety over
the election of Arbenz with his promise to continue Arevalo’s social reforms as
well as initiate agrarian reforms. Such agrarian reforms sought to expropriate,
with compensation, land left idle by 2.2 percent of the population (which, by
1950, claimed 70 percent of Guatemalan land) to the rest of the Guatemalan
people, thereby diversifying Guatemala’s export-based economy and reducing their dependency on imports.23 Arbenz’ measure was soundly rejected by
UFCO which voiced its fear of a loss of stability to policy makers within the
United States government.
However, as opposed to what authors Schlesinger and Kinzer have written on the influence of United Fruit lobbyists and the revolving door between
the company and U.S. political office, Immerman maintains that even without
such business influences and pressures, a government led removal of Arbenz
was imminent simply within the Cold War beliefs of communist international
threats.24 For Immerman, a misunderstanding by U.S. policy makers of the
intentions of Guatemalan reforms coupled with the broad definition of communism developed within the polar world of Cold War ethos brought about the
perceived need for intervention. By the time the more active anti-communist
foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower (in comparison to Truman) was elected
into office and John Foster Dulles was appointed as his Secretary of State, much
of Washington was in agreement that communism could be defined as simply
“opposing United States interests” and that identifying such elements could
be concluded through a “duck test” where the accused were guilty by merely
walking or talking like a communist.25
Immerman relies on the wealth of behind-the-scenes insights revealed
through the Eisenhower Diaries, NSC documents, and “Whitman file” transcripts between the President and Dulles to reveal the hard-line, anti-communist
beliefs that guided the President and Secretary of State in opposition to what
Ibid., 65.
For an argument blaming the infiltration of business into U.S. politics resulting in the
Guatemalan coup see Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American
Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Immerman, 123-124.
25
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they believed were the failed containment measures of the Truman administration in China and Korea. In light of these documents, Immerman contends
that ignorance and a general lack of information and evidence did not stop the
administration from green lighting project PBSUCCESS, the covert operation
to overthrow Arbenz, into action. Repeatedly, “tenuous and indirect” evidence
as well as intelligence that showed “nothing conclusive” for an international
communist conspiracy left Dulles continually frustrated in his attempt to find
a connection.26 This lack of direct communist evidence to support covert intervention strengthens Immerman’s argument for a nationalist revolution unable
to be translated into the absolutist language of Cold War polarity.
Christian Appy expands on the argument for a lack of evidence and
understanding of the Guatemalan people used to justify military intervention
into Guatemalan politics. However, in his article “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan
Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take Credit for a Third World Coup,”
Appy concentrates on Eisenhower’s personality, a product of his competitive
spirit as well as societal trends of Cold War urgency and polarity to make his
unique argument. For Appy, the means by which the Eisenhower administration
both denied involvement as well as took credit for the 1954 Guatemalan coup
is emblematic of the mentalité that drove the administration to intervene in the
first place. Just as policy makers created a shaky, yet unchallenged narrative to
comment on their Latin American success, so too did Eisenhower and Dulles
“file the edges” of Guatemalan communist evidence to make their actions fit
their predetermined national security priorities. Appy argues that this is partially
indicative of Eisenhower’s competitive, score-keeping spirit, where the odds
for success (cited in classified papers as merely twenty percent) were pitted
against images and assumption of “Amero-centric” “superpower arrogance”
that shaped much of Cold War policy. Thus, as Appy writes: “Once Eisenhower
had concluded that Guatemala had fallen within the ‘Soviet orbit,’ that satellite’s internal life and history was, by definition, rendered largely irrelevant.” 27
Though much of Appy’s argument is informed by the work of highly
Ibid., 185.
Christian Appy, “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take
Credit for a Third World Coup” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United States
Imperialism, 1945-1966, edited by Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 2000), 190.
26
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regarded scholars on the subject, his original vantage point is guided by the
many personal letters and diary entrees available through the Eisenhower Library.
The most interesting, and unique, source used sets the tone and trajectory of
Appy’s deconstruction: a sketch drawn by Eisenhower the day after the coup on
a morning meeting agenda outline (for an image of the “Eisenhower doodle”
see Figure 1).28 From the roughly sketched images of a bare-chested Anglo (presumably a self portrait), gun boat and non-military vessels, as well as “Internal
security” and “Guatemala” written twice, underlined, and traced repeatedly,
Appy attempts to deconstruct the images as representative of the assumptions
and themes that shaped U.S. Cold War foreign policy. For Appy, these images shed light on how “Eisenhower envisioned the world he so profoundly
affected”—a faceless world, void of the individual Guatemalans he sought to
redirect, in need of Anglo strength and security. Thus, despite Eisenhower’s selfpublicized support of the non-existent “Guatemalan counterrevolutionaries”
and “people-to-people” exchanges, “he left no evidence of any serious interest
in the people of Guatemala.”29
Those readers who have little patience for cultural abstractions and deconstructions will be pleased that Eisenhower’s doodle does not serve as a
“smoking gun” or central primary source for any argument of subconscious
motives or actions. Rather, through the use of personal letters by Eisenhower,
Appy extracts a common theme of competition, from the golf course to the
bridge table, which can be seen in his secret organizing and public explanation
of the 1954 coup. 30 From laughing at Secretary of State Dulles’ and assistant
Henry Holland’s warning of the twenty percent chance for a successful coup
of Arbenz as well as its legality under international agreements, to his preoccupation with golf games leading up to and during the time of the coup and
his desires to take credit for what was projected as another notch within the
anti-communist struggle, Appy raises important questions concerning the level
of interest Eisenhower had for the actual people of Guatemala—that Eisenhower
was at once intricately involved yet emotionally removed from the coup itself.
28
Appy’s work is informed by prominent scholars on the subject including Stephen Schlesinger
and Stephen Kinzer, Richard Immerman, Piero Gleijese, Jim Handy, Blanche Wiesen Cook, and
Nick Cullather.
29
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30
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Along with the actual planning of the coup, media propaganda within
Guatemala as well as the United States played a key role in its success. At
once, the administration faced the difficult task of denying U.S. involvement,
presenting Guatemala as a dangerous “communist beachhead,” and revealing
a popular Guatemalan resistance that did not exist, while taking credit for
the covert operation.31 To achieve this ambitious goal, Appy suggests that the
threat of communism within Guatemala was relentlessly presented as a real
and dangerous international threat while descriptions of the actual “popular
revolt” were left vague and inconclusive. Any challenges to the legitimacy of
the revolt were not only dismissed as a “communist lie” but “regarded as a retroactive justification for the very operation they were disavowing.”32 Thus, the
vilification of the Arbenz government and the subsequent dismissal of foul play

Fig. 1: “Eisenhower Doodle.”
(Photocopy from Christian Appy, Cold
War Constructions: the Political Culture
of the United States Imperialism,
1945-1966. Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2000, 184.

31
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closely paralleled the domestic fear mongering campaigns of McCarthyism. In
the end, through a complacent press and presidential memoirs and speeches,
both Eisenhower and Dulles were able at once to affirm Guatemalan popular
support for the counterrevolution as well as cite the event as a victory for U.S.
desires to thwart the communist threat throughout the world.
As with most actions, the true impact of the intervention is only revealed
in its enduring legacy. For Immerman and Appy, the impact of the Guatemalan
coup was indeed far reaching. Primarily, the 1954 coup reinstated the life
Guatemalan’s had fought to diminish. Castillo Armas, the first in a long line of
U.S.-supported presidents after the coup, not only reversed the land and labor
reforms to support United Fruit once again, but installed an oppressive regime
that fell hard on dissent through “Gestapo-like tactics” resulting in a fifty year
cycle of repression and killing of over 200,000 lives.33 Beyond the persecution
of the Guatemalans themselves, both Immerman and Appy make a compelling
argument that the perceived success of the 1954 coup led to misguided conclusions that were applied to subsequent interventions. Just as the Iranian coup
a year earlier provided a framework for the events in Guatemala, the blanket
model of combining military threats, covert operations, and indigenous alliances
are argued to have been directly applied to the soon to follow intervention in
Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs invasion the following decade.
Both Immerman’s and Appy’s discussions of Cold War policy through
preemptive action in Guatemala complicates our understanding of the motivations and assumptions behind Cold War covert actions. Although in one sense
Immerman’s and Appy’s work testifies to the incredibly blurred and uncertain
world in which foreign policy leaders worked, it also speaks to this paper’s theme
of selective ignorance of regional historical directions and the extent to which
the Eisenhower administration was willing to ensure economic, political, and
ideological security in Latin America. Thus, during a time when the actions of
individual actors became increasingly more powerful, and the implications of
such decisions more detrimental, an examination of personalities and viewpoints
has the potential to reveal additional context to motivations and reasoning of
Cold War policies.
During the beginning years of the Cold War, little room was left for
neutrality as Soviet/American bipolarity effectively mapped out and kept a
33
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running score of regional ideological and political affiliation. For the Eisenhower
administration, the Sukarno government in Indonesia fit this mold of dangerous
neutrality and, running on the momentum of perceived successful subversive
action in Iran, Guatemala, and the Congo, opted for another round in CIA- led
covert political disruption. In Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, Audrey and George Kahin argue that the covert operations used to provoke and abet a major revolution and civil war in
Indonesia during the late 1950s is attributed not only to “presidential prejudice”
of popular elected leaders, but a reliance on poor intelligence gathering by the
CIA and the political naïveté that followed. With a wealth of over 45 years of
research including both CIA and Indonesian documents as well as firsthand
accounts and interviews conducted by George Kahin in Indonesia during the
1940s revolution, the Kahins’ critical yet sophisticated assessment of the failed
1959 coup warn of the dangers in using past and ultimately detrimental CIA led
actions as guidelines when applied to complex and varying regional contexts.
To give context to American involvement in the region and Indonesia’s
non-alignment decision, the Kahins describe America’s favorable yet at times
contradictory role in the 1949 Revolution. Though America had supported the
popular revolution against Dutch colonial control, after the successful declaration of the independent Indonesian state the U.S. refrained from holding the
Dutch accountable in the United Nations to relinquish its control over the
culturally significant region of West Irian (New Guinea). The Kahins maintain
that although the Dutch were probably correct in their desire to withhold the
small portion of the island to appease the nationalism of chauvinistic elements
in Holland needed to pass the decolonization agreement through Parliament,
the Indonesians saw the act as an illegitimate retention of culturally significant
land. 34 Ultimately for the Kahins, the support of the United States behind the
Dutch West Irian issue as well as unscrupulous, U.S.-mediated debt negotiations that favored the Dutch made Indonesian alignment with the U.S. a less
than favorable resolution.
In an act of realism and balance, much of which has come from George
Kahin’s residency and connections in Indonesia during the post-revolution
34
Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995), 34-35.
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era, the Kahins portray the revolution’s shaky government as a less than ideal
system, far from a popular utopia of democratic self-determination. Due to
the region’s unfortunate history during WWII, Japanese occupation, and the
revolution against the Dutch, much of the country’s government, infrastructure, economy, and social well being had been either dismantled or destroyed.
With the country experiencing growing hardships and the colonial hegemonic
educational structure severely weakened during the decade leading up to the
revolution, much of the incoming political contenders espoused left of center
variants of socialist, anti-foreign capital control. Within this context, Sukarno,
Indonesia’s president from 1945 to 1967, sought a “guided democracy” to
strengthen national unity where exploitation of weaker groups would be avoided
through a more balanced power structure. 35
This desire for unity sounded alarms for President Eisenhower, Secretary
of State Dulles, and CIA operatives in Java (including brother, Allen Dulles).
Following the Truman administration’s loss of China, criticized for allowing the
weakening Nationalist government to maintain its territorial integrity and thus
unity in time of crisis, the Eisenhower administration perceived the proposed
plan for Indonesian unification as a potential threat for communist subversion. Criticism and warnings by U.S. ambassador in Indonesia, John Allison,
that the barriers which propped up non-alignment sentiment in the country
were rooted in the debt and territorial issues surrounding the United State’s
support of the Dutch, were ignored and ultimately led to his reassignment in
Czechoslovakia. Based on the inaccurate conclusions of a communist “absolute majority” on select islands made by the CIA (specifically John’s brother,
Allen Dulles), despite counter evidence provided by ambassador Allison, the
Eisenhower administration not only chose to support rebel colonels against the
government, but discouraged compromise between the opposing sides through
a refusal to bend on the Dutch territorial and debt issues as well as through
encouragement and support of rebellious army colonels. Though the opposing
sides were far from willing or prepared to engage in another war, the U.S. had
anticipated the possibility of a civil war and was already building up support
for the rebels during the ultimately futile negotiations. 36
35
36
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As U.S. officials had predicted, the result was a civil war in 1958 between
the Sukarno government and the rebels, secretly backed by American forces
through unmarked air support and armaments. For two years leading up to
and during the war, U.S. support continued for the rebels, yet due to an overestimation of popular support for rebel leaders (hurt by Indonesian awareness
of U.S. support), an underestimation of nationalist support for Sukarno, and
the capture of American pilot Allen Pope, the Eisenhower administration was
forced to reassess its policy. In a move to increase flexibility, yet in hindsight
painfully contradictory, Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower
made the decision to switch their support to the Sukarno government while
continuing, albeit severely limited, support for the rebels. 37 In the end, U.S.
meddling in the affairs of Indonesia had strengthened the very forces Americans
had tried to diminish: the non-alignment of the Sukarno government, the army’s
increased authority through martial law, as well as the now growing popularity
of the communist PKI party due to their capitalization of outrage over U.S.
involvement. The result was a tripolarization between these now enlarged,
tense, and brittle fractions leaving neither an effective form of governance nor
political stability, paving the way for a major political explosion ending in a
failed communist coupe, an army-led counter-coup, and the beginnings of a
singular military dictatorship under Suharto in 1965, lasting until 1998. 38
As what is now embarrassingly clear and yet frustratingly absent during
the time, was any consideration to dissenting views of intervention. However,
despite these inconsistencies, an argument for a clearer vision based on the present benefit of hindsight is perhaps too much to ask of historical actors. Rather,
what is particularly troublesome with the case of covert action in Indonesia
is not only the flip-flopping of U.S. support during the civil war, but more
importantly the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to encourage
such a steadfast, uncompromising division that would most certainly lead to a
devastating loss of life (thousands during the Civil War and over half a million
during the 1965-66 massacre under the military coup victor, Suharto) and
societal cohesion. 39 Thus, as with the covert actions in Iran and Guatemala,
despite intentions of precision and strategic action meant to ultimately save lives
Ibid., 190.
Ibid., 220.
39
Ibid., 228.
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19

the forum
by avoiding conventional or atomic warfare, the intervention methods chosen
ultimately reflect a failure to gather as well as consider known intelligence of
regional and historical circumstances, resulting in the loss of life and societal
disruption well beyond the organizers’ predicted consequences.
This stage within the Cold War offers a glimpse of the world at the height
of modernity: societal power and structure whittled down to two competing
ideologies, one claiming supremacy as the bearer of history and the future,
while the other asserting its authority as the protector of human rights and
freedom; technological might to annihilate thousands at the push of a button;
and the ability to overrule the natural boundaries that had once offered societies security and comfort from foreign threats. With the amazingly destructive
power to human life, society, and nature displayed during the Second World
War, many saw the urgency of this global crossroads and chose to act, not with
the total might of their visible arsenal, but with the precision and quickness
only possible under the cloak of secrecy.
With modernity, however, the perceived ability of individuals to supersede
and manipulate humankind and the natural world in which they reside, comes
the responsibility to use all of the knowledge at one’s disposal. Though President
Eisenhower was merely a single individual, surrounded by persuasive cabinet
members and consumed by a Cold War culture of uncertainty, distrust, and
urgency the actions he chose to pursue failed to set a precedent for appropriate
conduct within a new and changing world. With the perception of repetitive
triumphant operations so close in their rearview mirror, Eisenhower and his
administration continued down an interventionist path, ignoring evidence that
challenged what they believed had been successful manipulations of foreign
government and society. For the Eisenhower administration, despite their efforts to use far less invasive and physically damaging methods, societal scars left
from the coups d’état had far reaching implications. By validating or glossing
over events that had such a detrimental effect on the people, government, and
overall well being of developing nations, historians not only risk promoting a
repetition of such short-sighted decisions, but also threaten our global reputation as a nation that holds freedom above oppression.
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